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作者：Duch-Brown, Nestor; Grzybowski, Lukasz; Romahn, Andre; Verboven, Frank
作者单位：IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; University of Cape Town; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; KU Leuven
摘要：We develop a framework to evaluate the impact of market integra-tion, accounting for spillovers between multiple distribution chan-nels. We adapt the standard random coefficients logit demand model to allow for substitution between channels and consumer arbitrage across countries. We apply our framework to the European por-table PC market, where geoblocking practices that restrict online cross-border trade have recently been banned. Consumers in high income countries gain most from price conve...
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作者：Quint, Daniel; Weretka, Marek
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule. (JEL D43, D44, D83)
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作者：Bagwell, Kyle; Lee, Seung Hoon
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yonsei University
摘要：We consider the single-sector version of the Melitz-Ottaviano model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. We characterize the first-best and market allocations. We find that the market provides the first-best level of entry but too little selection; hence, the market provides too many varieties and too little aggregate quantity, and allocates too little (much) production to low (high) cost realizations. Allowing for a broad family of quantity allocation functions, we establish ...
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作者：Teh, Tat-How; Liu, Chunchun; Wright, Julian; Zhou, Junhe
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Tsinghua University
摘要：We provide a general framework to analyze competition between any number of symmetric two-sided transaction platforms, in which buyers and sellers can multihome. We show how key primitives such as the number of platforms, the fraction of buyers that find multihoming costly, the value of transactions, and the degree of user heterogeneity jointly determine the level and structure of platform fees. Even though platform entry always reduces the total fee level, whether it shifts the fee structure ...
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作者：Hodgson, Charles
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Manufacturers of durable goods can encourage consumers facing transaction costs to upgrade by accepting used units as trade-ins. These buyback schemes increase demand for new units, but increase the supply of used units if trade-ins are resold. I investigate the equilibrium effects of buyback schemes in the market for business jets. I find that buyback increases manufacturer revenue by 7.2 percent at fixed prices. However, in equilibrium this revenue gain is diminished by 43 percent due to sub...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Szydlowsii, Martin
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that...
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作者：Clithero, John A.; Lee, Jae Joon; Tasoff, Joshua
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University
摘要：The canonical direct-elicitation approach for measuring individuals' valuations for goods is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure , which generates willingness-to-pay (WTP) values that are imprecise and systematically biased. We show that enhancing elicited WTP values with supervised machine learning (SML) can improve estimates of peoples' out-of-sample purchase behavior. Furthermore , swapping WTP data with choice data generated from a simple task leads to comparable performance. We quantify...
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作者：Li, Fei; Zhou, Jidong
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Yale University
摘要：We propose a model of how multiple societies respond to a common crisis. A government faces a damned-either-way policymaking dilemma: aggressive intervention contains the crisis, but the resulting good outcome makes people skeptical about the costly response; light intervention worsens the crisis and causes the government to be faulted for not doing enough. When multiple societies encounter the crisis sequentially, due to this policymaking dilemma, late societies may underperform despite havi...
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作者：Reshef, Oren
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Entry of new firms onto a platform has an ambivalent effect on the incumbent firms operating on the platform: the main tension lies between the negative effects of increased competitive pressure and positive indirect network effects. This paper empirically studies the net effect of these countervailing forces and its dependence on firm quality, using a quasi-exogenous shock on a large online platform. On average, market expansion favors incumbents, though the average effect masks substantial h...
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作者：Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This...
