作者：CHANG, C; KAN, CY
摘要：If (N, upsilon, B) is a decomposable convex game and theta is one of the solution concepts of bargaining set, kernel, prekernel, nucleolus, or stable set, then theta(N, upsilon, B) = theta(N, upsilon). The same is true for the core and the Shapley value even if the game is not convex. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
作者：BOYLAN, RT
摘要：A Nash equilibrium is a stationary point for a class of evolutionary dynamics. However, not all stationary points of these dynamics are Nash equilibria. An ''evolutionary equilibrium'' is the limit of stationary points of an evolutionary process as the proportion of the population that mutates goes to zero. The set of these evolutionary equilibria is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria (and thus of the set of Nash equilibria) and a superset of the set of regular equilibria and t...
作者：MONAHAN, GE; SOBEL, MJ
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
