EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIA RESISTANT TO MUTATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BOYLAN, RT
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1994.1033
发表日期：
1994
页码：
10-34
关键词：
摘要：
A Nash equilibrium is a stationary point for a class of evolutionary dynamics. However, not all stationary points of these dynamics are Nash equilibria. An ''evolutionary equilibrium'' is the limit of stationary points of an evolutionary process as the proportion of the population that mutates goes to zero. The set of these evolutionary equilibria is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria (and thus of the set of Nash equilibria) and a superset of the set of regular equilibria and the set of ESS. Journal of Economic Literature Numbers: C72, C73. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.