-
作者：NOWAK, AS
摘要：In this paper, we provide some conditions under which zero-sum average payoff stochastic games with a Borel state space have a value and the players possess optimal stationary strategies. One contains as special cases various ergodicity assumptions considered recently in the theory of Markov decision processes. We also consider games with state independent transition probabilities. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：MCCLENDON, JF
摘要：Various sufficient conditions are given for a noncooperative game to have a Nash equilibrium. One hypothesis used is that of limiting the variables that a player's payoff function depends on-this allows a weakening of the hypotheses imposed on the choice sets. Other conditions allow convexity to be dropped or replaced by contractibility. Approximate equilibrium results are given with some noncompactness of choice sets. The methods used for obtaining the equilibria are used to discuss the price...
-
作者：BONDAREVA, ON; DRIESSEN, TSH
作者单位：University of Twente
摘要：The topic of the presentation is the determination of exact bounds for the nonempty core of a cooperative game in characteristic function form. The exact lower and upper core bounds are determined in terms of the extremal excesses with respect to reduced upper and lower coverings. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：CHANG, C; KAN, CY
摘要：If (N, upsilon, B) is a decomposable convex game and theta is one of the solution concepts of bargaining set, kernel, prekernel, nucleolus, or stable set, then theta(N, upsilon, B) = theta(N, upsilon). The same is true for the core and the Shapley value even if the game is not convex. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：BOYLAN, RT
摘要：A Nash equilibrium is a stationary point for a class of evolutionary dynamics. However, not all stationary points of these dynamics are Nash equilibria. An ''evolutionary equilibrium'' is the limit of stationary points of an evolutionary process as the proportion of the population that mutates goes to zero. The set of these evolutionary equilibria is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria (and thus of the set of Nash equilibria) and a superset of the set of regular equilibria and t...
-
作者：MONAHAN, GE; SOBEL, MJ
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
