ON NASH EQUILIBRIUM
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MCCLENDON, JF
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1994.1015
发表日期：
1994
页码：
283-298
关键词：
摘要：
Various sufficient conditions are given for a noncooperative game to have a Nash equilibrium. One hypothesis used is that of limiting the variables that a player's payoff function depends on-this allows a weakening of the hypotheses imposed on the choice sets. Other conditions allow convexity to be dropped or replaced by contractibility. Approximate equilibrium results are given with some noncompactness of choice sets. The methods used for obtaining the equilibria are used to discuss the price-dependent excess-demand approach to classical economic equilibrium. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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