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作者：Milchtaich, I
摘要：A class of noncooperative games in which the players share a common set of strategies is described. The payoff a player receives for playing a particular strategy depends only on the total number of players playing the same strategy and decreases with that number in a manner which is specific to the particular player. it is shown that each game in this class possesses at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Best-reply paths in which players, one at a time, shift to best-reply strateg...
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作者：Bensaid, B; GaryBobo, RJ
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We study a game-theoretic model of preplay negotiation with three players, A, B and C. Player A (the leader) can sequentially offer a finite number T of contracts to the other players prior to his (her) choice of an action affecting B and C's payoffs. Contracts simply specify path-dependent transfers between the players. The bargaining procedure is a game in extensive form with perfect and complete information. We compute the subgame perfect equilibria of this game and provide explicit formula...
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作者：Blume, A
摘要：This paper characterizes robust outcomes in sender-receiver games. An equilibrium (a retract) is perturbed message persistent (PMP) if it is the limit (Hausdorff limit) of persistent equilibria(persistent retracts)in perturbed games. In strict common interest games separating equilibria are PMP and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. With partial common interest, there exists a PMP retract which partially separates types and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. Under a rich language...
