1998

最新文章

• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency AI翻译
  作者：Laussel, D; Le Breton, M
  作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
  摘要：A private, profit-maximizing firm produces a public good that enters the utility functions of several users. Each of them separately designs and proposes to the firm a contract specifying a transfer payment as a function of the amount of public good supplied. The firm has to accept or to refuse each contract before knowing the realized value of a random variable that enters its cost function. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and explore some refinements ruling out Pareto inefficient e...
• An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable AI翻译
  作者：Feinberg, Y
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：Aumann and Myerson (1988) defined a noncooperative linking game leading to the formation of cooperation structures. They asked whether it is possible for a simple game to have a stable structure in which no coalition forms, i.e., in which the cooperation graph is not internally complete but is connected and stable. We answer this question affirmatively; specifically, we present a simple proper weighted majority game with a connected incomplete structure, and we prove it to be stable under any ...
• On the state of the art in game theory: An interview with Robert Aumann AI翻译
  作者：van Damme, E; Aumann, R
• Delegation and threat in bargaining AI翻译
  作者：Segendorff, B
  作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
  摘要：Two principals (nations) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on th...
• Evolution, games, and economic behaviour. AI翻译
  作者：Friedman, JW
  作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• Common priors and separation of convex sets AI翻译
  作者：Samet, D
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University
  摘要：We observe that the set of all priors of an agent is the convex hull of his types. A prior common to all agents exists if the sets of the agents' priors have a point in common, We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the intersection of several closed convex subsets of the simplex, which is an extension of the separation theorem. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of common prior is a special case of this. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Evolutionary game and equilibrium selection. AI翻译
  作者：Friedman, JW
  作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill