作者：Yi, SS
作者单位：Dartmouth College
摘要：This article shows that the Pareto efficient frontier of the Nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition-proof under the following conditions: (1) the game has three players, or, alternatively, a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum (but not on the composition) of other players' strategies; (2) an increase in a player's strategy either raises all other players' payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically; and (3) each prayer's payoff is s...
作者：Bikhchandani, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Simultaneous seared bid auctions of heterogeneous objects are analyzed. Each bidder's reservation value for an object depends upon the other objects he obtains. Bidders' reservation values are common knowledge. in simultaneous first-price auctions, the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations contains the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium allocations which in turn contains the set of strict Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Hence, pure strategy Nash equilibria (when they exist) are effici...
