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作者：Francesconi, Marco; James, Jonathan
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作者：Phillips, David C.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Researchers commonly measure discrimination by comparing responses to multiple fictional applicants sent to the same vacancy. I find evidence that these applications interact. Using data from several existing experiments, I find that applicants randomly assigned to compete against higher quality applicant pools receive more callbacks. In the presence of such spillovers, many experiments confound discrimination against an individual's characteristics with employers' responses to the composition...
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作者：Francesconi, Marco; James, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Bath
摘要：We estimate the effect of binge drinking on road accidents, accident and emergency (A&E) attendances and arrests using a variety of unique English data and a two-sample instrumental variables estimation procedure. Drinking $10+$ units of alcohol in a single session increases road accidents by 18.6%, injury-related A&E attendances by 6.6% and arrests by 71%. The marginal increase from eight to $10+$ alcoholic units implies nearly 6,100 extra road accidents every year, 63,000 additional A&E atte...
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作者：Debortoli, Davide; Kim, Jinill; Linde, Jesper; Nunes, Ricardo
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; Korea University; Sveriges Riksbank; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Surrey
摘要：Yes, a dual mandate makes a lot of sense. This article studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity, sometimes even larger than the weight on inflation. Two main factors drive our result. First, stabilising economic activity also stabilises other welfare-relevant variables. Second, the estimat...
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作者：Fluckiger, Matthias; Ludwig, Markus; Onder, Ali Sina
作者单位：Queens University Belfast; University of Bayreuth; University of Portsmouth
摘要：We exploit the West African Ebola epidemic as an event that necessitated the provision of a common-interest public good, Ebola control measures, to empirically investigate the effect of public good provision on state legitimacy. Our results show that state legitimacy, measured by trust in government authorities, increased with exposure to the epidemic. We argue, supported by results from SMS-message-based surveys, that a potentially important channel underlying this finding is a greater valuat...
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作者：Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Aalto University; KU Leuven
摘要：We study the contracts of 898 legal Finnish cartels. Cartels that exclusively allocate markets, either geographically or in the product/production space, are dominant in manufacturing. They are often bilateral and include a vertical dimension. Structural industry characteristics predict the type of a cartel, e.g., consistent with theory, quota cartels are more common in manufacturing and when buyers are primarily industrial. The contracts of quota cartels include more (governance) clauses. Pur...
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作者：Kanbur, Ravi; Snell, Andy
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Cornell University
摘要：Inequality indices are traditionally interpreted as measures of deviations from equality. This article interprets them instead as statistical tests for a null of fairness within well-defined income generating processes. We find that the likelihood ratio (LR) test for fairness versus unfairness within two such processes are proportional to Theil's first and second inequality indices respectively. The LR values may be used either as a test statistic or to approximate a Bayes factor that measures...
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作者：Eso, Peter; Wallace, Chris
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Oxford
摘要：This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices valid for one period. In the leading case of in...
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作者：Afzal, Uzma; d'Adda, Giovanna; Fafchamps, Marcel; Quinn, Simon; Said, Farah
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作者：Albornoz, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio; Hauk, Esther
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We study a model that integrates productive and socialising efforts with occupational choice, and endogenous spillovers. We show that more talented individuals work harder and contribute more to externalities, but also have incentives to segregate. Average socialising increases the productivity of the occupation. The size of an occupation grows with its synergies. Individuals underinvest in productive and socialising effort, and sort themselves inefficiently into occupations. We derive the opt...
