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作者：Cettolin, Elena; Suetens, Sigrid
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：We conducted an experiment with a representative sample of the Dutch population to study whether trustworthiness depends on the ethnicity of the interaction partner. Native Dutch trustees play with an anonymous trustor, who is either another native Dutch or a non-Western immigrant. We find that trustees reciprocate trust up to 12% less if the trustor is a non-Western immigrant than if he/she is native Dutch. This percentage increases up to 23% for trustees who report disliking ethnic diversity...
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作者：Iacopetta, Maurizio; Minetti, Raoul; Peretto, Pietro F.
作者单位：Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School; Michigan State University; Duke University
摘要：This article introduces corporate governance frictions into a growth model with endogenous market structure. Managers engage in corporate resource diversion and empire building. Shareholders discipline managers with incentive compensation contracts. A reform that mitigates corporate governance frictions boosts firms' entry and, for a given market structure, has an ambiguous impact on incumbents' return to product improvement. However, as the market structure adjusts, becoming more diffuse, inc...
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作者：Cavalcanti, Tiago; Da Mata, Daniel; Santos, Marcelo
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA); Insper
摘要：We construct a simple model of a city with heterogeneous agents and housing choice to explain the determinants of slums, home to about one-third of the urban population in developing countries. The model supports the main empirical evidence regarding slum formation and is able quantitatively to assess the role of each determinant of slum growth. We show that urban poverty, inequality and rural-urban migration explain much of the variation in slum growth in Brazil from 1980 to 2000. Ex ante eva...
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作者：Gallice, Andrea; Monzon, Ignacio
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Since agents realise that their own action may be observed, they have an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equi...
