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作者：Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Yale University
摘要：We investigate whether elected members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional, country and year effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by...
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作者：Chang, Roberto; Kaltani, Linda; Loayza, Norman V.
作者单位：The World Bank; International Monetary Fund; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper Studies how the effect of trade openness on economic growth may depend on complementary reforms that help a country take advantage of international competition. This issue is illustrated with a simple Harris-Todaro model where welfare gains after trade openness depend on the degree of labor market flexibility. The paper then presents cross-country, panel-data evidence on how the growth effect of openness may depend on a variety of structural characteristics. For this purpose, the em...
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作者：Kose, M. Ayhan; Prasad, Eswar S.; Terrones, Marco E.
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Cornell University; Brookings Institution
摘要：In theory, one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing. In this paper, we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns. Using a variety of empirical techniques, we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly nowhere near...
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作者：Kumar, Krishna B.; Matsusaka, John G.
作者单位：RAND Corporation; Rand Health
摘要：This paper develops a theory in which individuals can use one of two types of human/social capital to enforce contracts: Local capital relies on families and other personal networks; market capital relies on impersonal market institutions such as auditors and courts. Local capital is efficient when most trading is local, but only market capital can support trading between strangers that allows extensive division of labor and industrialization. We show that economies with a low cost of accumula...
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作者：Larson, Donald F.; Plessmann, Frank
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Farming households that differ in their ability or willingness to take on risks are likely to allocate resources and effort among income producing activities differently with consequences for productivity. In this paper we measure voluntary and involuntary departures from efficiency for rice producing households in the Bicol region of the Philippines. We take advantage of a panel of observations on households from 1978, 1983 and 1994. Available monthly weather data and survey information on pl...
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作者：Carril, Paul E.; Ponce Jarrin, Juan
作者单位：George Washington University; FLACSO Ecuador
摘要：Many governments provide monetary transfers to low-income families. The mechanism through which these subsidies are distributed may contain several inefficiencies that diminish the net-value obtained by the recipients. In this paper, we build and estimate a behavioral dynamic model that allows us to evaluate the efficiency of current and alternative distribution mechanisms. The proposed model is simple and resembles the individual's decision to collect the transfer. To estimate it, we use data...
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作者：Martimort, David; Straub, Stephane
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Edinburgh
摘要：This paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers. We show that there are cases in which privatization, even though it fosters investments in infrastructure, also opens the door to more corruption. The public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption. Our model thus helps understand the seemingly parad...
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作者：Kehoe, Timothy J.; Ruhl, Kim J.
作者单位：New York University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A sudden stop of capital flows into a developing country tends to be followed by a rapid switch from trade deficits to surpluses, a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and decreases in output and total factor productivity. Substantial reallocation takes place from the nontraded sector to the traded sector. We construct a multisector growth model, calibrate it to the Mexican economy, and use it to analyze Mexico's 1994-95 crisis. When subjected to a sudden stop, the model accounts for the t...
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作者：Dong, Xiao-yuan; Zhang, Liqin
作者单位：University of Winnipeg; China Agricultural University
摘要：We use firm-level data to analyze male-female wage differences in Chinese industry in the late 1990s. Our estimates indicate that employers' discrimination against women was not a significant source of the gender wage gap in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Instead, we find that the relative wage of unskilled female to male workers was higher than their relative productivity. This result indicates that unskilled female workers in the state sector had historically received wage premiums and con...
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作者：Aubert, Cecile; de Janvy, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth
作者单位：Universite de Bordeaux; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit th...
