作者：Lebrun, B; Tremblay, MC
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two-step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single-unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequence...
作者：Klonner, S
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Yale University
摘要：We model rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) among risk-averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks. A random Rosca is not Advantageous, whereas a bidding Rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries. The risk-sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding Rosc...
