Rotating savings and credit associations when participants are risk averse

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Klonner, S
• 署名单位: Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Yale University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00097
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 979-1005
• 关键词: economics; insurance; auctions

摘要

We model rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) among risk-averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks. A random Rosca is not Advantageous, whereas a bidding Rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries. The risk-sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding Roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk-sharing contract, and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution.