Multiunit pay-your-bid auction with one-dimensional multiunit demands

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lebrun, B; Tremblay, MC
• 署名单位: York University - Canada
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00104
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1135-1172
• 关键词: price; equilibria

摘要

An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two-step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single-unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the relative supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation.