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作者：Chang, YS; Kim, SB
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：At the aggregate level, the labor-supply elasticity depends on the reservation-wage distribution. We present a model economy where workforce heterogeneity stems from idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The model economy exhibits the cross-sectional earnings and wealth distributions that are comparable to those in the micro data. We find that the aggregate labor-supply elasticity of such an economy is around 1, greater than a typical micro estimate.
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作者：Matsuyama, K
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This article presents a model of the emergent class structure, in which a society inhabited by inherently identical households may be endogenously split into the rich bourgeoisie and the poor proletariat. For some parameter values, the model has no steady state where all households remain equally wealthy. In this case, the model predicts emergent class structure or the rise of class societies. Even if every household starts with the same amount of wealth, the society will experience symmetry-b...
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作者：Rendon, S
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：This article examines the relationship between wealth accumulation and job search dynamics. It proposes a model in which risk-averse individuals search for jobs, save, and borrow to smooth their consumption. One motivation for accumulating wealth is to finance voluntary quits in order to search for better jobs. Using data on men from the National Longitudinal Survey (1979 cohort), I estimate the individual's dynamic decision problem. The results show that borrowing constraints are tight and re...
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作者：Julien, Benoit; Kennes, John; King, Ian
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms ? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high- or low-productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on-the-job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump-shaped, skewed significantly ...
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作者：Monnet, Cyril
作者单位：European Central Bank
摘要：I show that the nature of agents' production determines whether they should issue money. I use a matching model with no commitment and no enforcement. Some agents can produce goods, whereas others are unproductive. All agents can produce at a cost a distinguishable, intrinsically useless but durable good: notes. Productive agents produce red notes whereas unproductive agents produce green notes. I find that green notes are the most efficient means of exchange, as they implement more allocation...
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作者：Ishikawa, J; Kiyono, K
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Waseda University
摘要：To examine how greenhouse-gas emission controls affect a country's industrial and trade structures, this article presents an open economy model that has both Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin features. We specifically compare emission quotas, emission taxes, and emission standards. The patterns of production and trade critically hinge on those policy tools. It is shown that a domestic emission control may lead to carbon leakage and may not reduce the world emissions, and that emission standards ma...
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作者：Gossner, O; Melissas, N
作者单位：University of Leicester
摘要：We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes truth-telling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only exists for high-surplus projects. Both an investment subsidy and an investment tax can increase welfare. The more precise the sender's information, the higher her incentives to truthfully reveal her privat...
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作者：Haag, M; Lagunoff, R
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Warwick
摘要：This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his co...
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作者：Brien, MJ; Lillard, LA; Stern, S
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
摘要：The objective of this research is to further our understanding of how and why individuals enter and leave coresidential relationships. We develop and estimate an economic model of nonmarital cohabitation, marriage, and divorce that is consistent with current data on the formation and dissolution of relationships. Jovanovic's (Journal of Political Economy 87 (1979), 972-90) theoretical matching model is extended to help explain household formation and dissolution behavior. Implications of the m...
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作者：Alonso-Carrera, J; Caballé, J; Raurich, X
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidade de Vigo; University of Barcelona
摘要：We analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. In particular, we show that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient when consumption externalities and habit-adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes.
