Informational cascades elicit private information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gossner, O; Melissas, N
• 署名单位: University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00380.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 297-325
• 关键词: Cheap talk; COORDINATION

摘要

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes truth-telling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only exists for high-surplus projects. Both an investment subsidy and an investment tax can increase welfare. The more precise the sender's information, the higher her incentives to truthfully reveal her private information.