Private versus public money
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Monnet, Cyril
署名单位：
European Central Bank
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00401.x
发表日期：
2006
页码：
951-960
关键词：
摘要：
I show that the nature of agents' production determines whether they should issue money. I use a matching model with no commitment and no enforcement. Some agents can produce goods, whereas others are unproductive. All agents can produce at a cost a distinguishable, intrinsically useless but durable good: notes. Productive agents produce red notes whereas unproductive agents produce green notes. I find that green notes are the most efficient means of exchange, as they implement more allocations than red notes and at a lower cost. Therefore, unproductive agents should issue money. I associate unproductive agents to agents producing public goods.
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