Residual wage disparity and coordination unemployment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Julien, Benoit; Kennes, John; King, Ian
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00402.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 961-989
• 关键词: Directed search; equilibrium; auctions; MODEL; size; job

摘要

How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms ? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high- or low-productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on-the-job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump-shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75-90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.