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作者：Loh, Isaac; Phelan, Gregory
作者单位：Northwestern University; Williams College
摘要：We provide a model of boundedly rational, multidimensional learning and characterize when beliefs will converge to the truth. Agents maintain beliefs as marginal probabilities instead of joint probabilities, and agents' information is of lower dimension than the model. As a result, for some observations, agents may face an identification problem affecting the role of data in inference. Beliefs converge to the truth when these observations are rare, but beliefs diverge when observations present...
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作者：Letina, Igor; Schmutzler, Armin
作者单位：University of Bern; University of Zurich
摘要：This article analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research approach, but the best approach is unknown. Inducing a variety of research approaches generates an option value. We show that suitable contests can induce such variety. The buyer-optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where suppliers can choose only between a low bid and a high bid. This contest implements the socially optimal variety for a suitable parameter range. Finally, we com...
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作者：Bellora, Cecilia; Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
作者单位：INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：Pests create biodiversity effects that increase food production risks and decrease productivity when agricultural production is specialized. Pesticides contain these effects, but damage the environment and human health. When opening to trade, governments are tempted to restrict pesticide use because, with more food being imported, less pesticide is needed for domestic consumption. However, pesticide restrictions hinder the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. ...
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作者：Boel, Paola; Waller, Christopher J.
作者单位：Sveriges Riksbank; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Deakin University
摘要：We construct a monetary economy with aggregate liquidity shocks and heterogeneous idiosyncratic preference shocks. In this environment, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound (ZLB) even when the Friedman rule is the best interest-rate policy the central bank can implement. As a consequence, central bank stabilization policy, which takes the form of repo arrangements in response to aggregate demand shocks, temporarily relaxes the liquidity constraint of impatient agents at the ZLB....
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作者：Horan, Sean; Osborne, Martin J.; Sanver, M. Remzi
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Toronto; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：May's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of independence of irrelevant alternatives for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show al...
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作者：Brooks, Wyatt J.; Pujolas, Pau S.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; McMaster University
摘要：We measure gains from trade in multisector economies with nonhomothetic preferences where changes in trade costs generate reallocation of expenditure across sectors. We show how to measure the trade elasticity and how it relates to welfare. In this environment, the trade elasticity now varies both across countries and with levels of trade costs. In an application, we find that the trade elasticity varies substantially across countries and that the gains from moving from autarky to observed tra...
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作者：Bag, Parimal K.; Sharma, Tridib
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：Two career-concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker (D). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D. Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effectiv...
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作者：Newberry, Peter; Zhou, Xiaolu
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Xiamen University
摘要：We study the heterogeneous effect of online reputation for sellers that differ in their national presence and examine how this heterogeneity affects the distribution of sales on a large Chinese platform. We estimate a demand model that incorporates a learning process and allow for the process to vary across sellers who are differentiated by their national presence. The estimates suggest that the impact of reputation is larger for local sellers. Using these estimates, we find that removing the ...
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作者：Ghosh, Sambuddha; Gratton, Gabriele; Shen, Caixia
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of New South Wales Sydney; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
摘要：A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If Challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict, each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore, nonconcession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, offers made during negotiations determine how conflict unfolds if negotiations fail. In tur...
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作者：Clark, Alexander T.; Tenev, Nicholas H.
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
摘要：We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two-party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self-interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degr...
