SEQUENTIAL EXPERT ADVICE: SUPERIORITY OF CLOSED-DOOR MEETINGS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bag, Parimal K.; Sharma, Tridib
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12407
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1877-1910
• 关键词: Information aggregation; eliciting information; decision-making; committees; TRANSPARENCY; deliberation; dissent; debate

摘要

Two career-concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker (D). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D. Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effective only under secrecy. These results are obtained when experts only recommend decisions. If they also report the quality of advice, fully revealing equilibrium may exist.