VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clark, Alexander T.; Tenev, Nicholas H.
• 署名单位: United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12401
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1705-1735
• 关键词: political-action; voter turnout; people vote; incentives; networks; NORMS

摘要

We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two-party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self-interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.