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作者：Cronin, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：This study quantifies the moral hazard effect of health insurance on medical expenditure by estimating a dynamic model of within-year medical care consumption that allows for insurance selection, endogenous health transitions, and individual uncertainty about medical care prices in an environment where insurance has nonlinear cost-sharing features. The results suggest that moral hazard accounts for 53.1%, on average, of total annual medical expenditure when insured. This estimate is significan...
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作者：Paciello, Luigi; Pozzi, Andrea; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：Using microdata from a U.S. retailer we document that customer turnover responds to pricing. We study the optimal price setting of a firm when its demand has an extensive margin that is elastic to price due to customers' opportunity to search for an alternative supplier. The price pass-through of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is incomplete, with the most productive firms passing through more. Firm demand is more persistent than price. Higher demand is associated with lower markups due to h...
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作者：Newberry, Peter; Zhou, Xiaolu
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Xiamen University
摘要：We study the heterogeneous effect of online reputation for sellers that differ in their national presence and examine how this heterogeneity affects the distribution of sales on a large Chinese platform. We estimate a demand model that incorporates a learning process and allow for the process to vary across sellers who are differentiated by their national presence. The estimates suggest that the impact of reputation is larger for local sellers. Using these estimates, we find that removing the ...
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作者：Jin, Gu; Zhu, Tao
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：For a class of standard and widely used preferences, a one-shot money injection in a standard matching model can induce a significant and persistent output response by dispersing the distribution of wealth. Decentralized trade matters for both persistence and significance. Following the injection, the price response may be sluggish, the markup may move up with output, and both the interest rate and the inflation rate may drop below their trend levels.
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作者：Cooper, Russell; Liu, Huacong
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; European University Institute; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Hamburg
摘要：This article studies the allocation of heterogeneous agents to levels of educational attainment. The goal is to understand the magnitudes and sources of mismatch in this assignment, both in theory and in the data. The article presents evidence of substantial mismatch between ability and educational attainment across 21 OECD countries, with a main focus on Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Model parameters are estimated using a simulated method of moments approach. The main empirica...
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作者：Harenberg, Daniel; Ludwig, Alexander
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We ask whether a pay-as-you-go financed social security system is welfare improving in an economy with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. We show that the whole welfare benefit from insurance against both risks is greater than the sum of benefits from insurance against the isolated risks. One reason is the convexity of the welfare gain. The other reason is a direct risk interaction amplifying the utility losses from risk. Our quantitative evaluation shows that introducing a minimum pension lead...
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作者：Kim, Jinill; Ruge-Murcia, Francisco
作者单位：Korea University; McGill University
摘要：This article studies the implication of extreme shocks for monetary policy. The analysis is based on a small-scale New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages where shocks are drawn from asymmetric generalized extreme value distributions. A nonlinear perturbation solution of the model is estimated by the simulated method of moments. Under the Ramsey policy, the central bank responds nonlinearly and asymmetrically to shocks. The trade-off between targeting a gross inflation rate above 1 as...
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作者：Chang, Yongsung; Kim, Sun-Bin; Kwon, Kyooho; Rogerson, Richard
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Yonsei University; Korea Development Institute (KDI); Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study business cycle fluctuations in heterogeneous agent general equilibrium models featuring intensive and extensive margins of labor supply. A nonlinear mapping from time devoted to work to labor services generates operative extensive and intensive margins. Our model captures the salient features of the empirical distribution of hours worked, including how individuals transit within this distribution. We study how various specifications influence labor supply responses to aggregate techno...
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作者：Ghosh, Sambuddha; Gratton, Gabriele; Shen, Caixia
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of New South Wales Sydney; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
摘要：A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If Challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict, each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore, nonconcession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, offers made during negotiations determine how conflict unfolds if negotiations fail. In tur...
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作者：Clark, Alexander T.; Tenev, Nicholas H.
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
摘要：We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two-party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self-interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degr...
