INSURANCE-INDUCED MORAL HAZARD: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF WITHIN-YEAR MEDICAL CARE DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cronin, Christopher J.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12349
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 187-218
• 关键词: health-insurance; adverse selection; demand; IMPACT; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; BEHAVIOR; CHOICE

摘要

This study quantifies the moral hazard effect of health insurance on medical expenditure by estimating a dynamic model of within-year medical care consumption that allows for insurance selection, endogenous health transitions, and individual uncertainty about medical care prices in an environment where insurance has nonlinear cost-sharing features. The results suggest that moral hazard accounts for 53.1%, on average, of total annual medical expenditure when insured. This estimate is significantly different, and generally larger, than that produced by an alternative model that is representative of the annual medical care decision-making models commonly found in the literature.