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作者：Horan, Sean; Osborne, Martin J.; Sanver, M. Remzi
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Toronto; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：May's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of independence of irrelevant alternatives for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show al...
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作者：Jung, Hojin; Kosmopoulou, Georgia; Lamarche, Carlos; Sicotte, Richard
作者单位：Jeonbuk National University; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Kentucky; University of Vermont
摘要：When firms bid in procurement auctions, they take into account the likelihood of future contract renegotiations. If they anticipate that certain input quantities will change ex post, they have an incentive to strategically skew their itemized bids, thereby increasing profits for themselves and costs for the procuring agency. We develop and estimate a structural model of strategic bidding using a data set of road construction projects in Vermont. We find that bidding strategies lead to increase...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization. We contrast sophisticated (Nash) versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies. Retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy; instead, they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance, as determined in equilibrium. We show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective, compared to Na...
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作者：Karaivanov, Alexander; Saurina, Jesus; Townsend, Robert M.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Banco de Espana; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We examine the effect of financial constraints on firm investment and cash flow. We combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry to classify firms according to whether they are family-owned, not family-owned, or belong to a family-linked network of firms and according to their number of banking relations (with none, one, or several banks). Our empirical strategy is structural, based on a dynamic model solved numerically to generate the joint distribut...
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作者：van den Berg, Gerard J.; van der Klaauw, Bas
作者单位：University of Bristol; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment...
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Kim, Sun Hyung
作者单位：University of Miami; University of Iowa
摘要：We consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals. Assuming that the high-quality seller insists on a price, we show that the low-quality seller's surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers' knowledge about the demand state. If they are also uncertain about demand, then demand uncertainty increases the low-quality seller's expected payoff, and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time. If buyers kn...
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作者：Merkurieva, Irina
作者单位：University of St Andrews
摘要：This article provides an empirical analysis of the effect of involuntary job loss on the lifetime income and labor supply of older workers. I develop and estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement with savings, costly job search, and exogenous layoffs. The average cost of job loss is equivalent to one year of predisplacement earnings, 70% due to the wage reduction and 30% to the search frictions. Displaced workers on average retire 14 months earlier. Workers who approached retirement d...
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作者：Brooks, Wyatt J.; Pujolas, Pau S.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; McMaster University
摘要：We measure gains from trade in multisector economies with nonhomothetic preferences where changes in trade costs generate reallocation of expenditure across sectors. We show how to measure the trade elasticity and how it relates to welfare. In this environment, the trade elasticity now varies both across countries and with levels of trade costs. In an application, we find that the trade elasticity varies substantially across countries and that the gains from moving from autarky to observed tra...
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作者：Ouazad, Amine; Ranciere, Romain
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Southern California
摘要：This article develops a general equilibrium model of location choice where mortgage approval rates determine household-specific choice sets. Estimation of the model using San Francisco Bay area data reveals that the price sensitivity of borrowing constraints explains about two-thirds of the price elasticity of neighborhood demand. General equilibrium analysis of the 2000-2006 relaxation of lending standards predicts the following impacts on prices and neighborhood demographics: (i) an increase...
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作者：Bag, Parimal K.; Sharma, Tridib
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：Two career-concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker (D). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D. Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effectiv...
