RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12348
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 157-186
• 关键词: electoral competition; INFORMATION; MODEL; equilibrium; platforms; BEHAVIOR; POLICY; aggregation; motivations; preferences

摘要

We provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization. We contrast sophisticated (Nash) versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies. Retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy; instead, they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance, as determined in equilibrium. We show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective, compared to Nash, voting. Moreover, this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals.