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作者：Bose, Subir; Daripa, Arup
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; University of Leicester
摘要：We study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity. We assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion; in particular, they are represented by the epsilon-contamination model. We show that a simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction can extract almost all surplus. This contrasts with optimal auctions under IPV without ambiguity as well as with optimal static auctions with ambiguity-in all of these, types other than the lowest participating ...
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作者：Ennis, Huberto M.; Keister, Todd
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation [E.J. Green, P. Lin, Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents. We derive the efficient allocation in closed form. We show that, in some cases, the intermediary cannot uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism. In these cases, the mechanism also admits an equ...
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作者：Kesten, Onur
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We consider the problem of randomly assigning it indivisible objects to n agents. Recent research introduced a promising mechanism, the probabilistic serial that has superior efficiency properties than the most common real-life mechanism random priority. On the other hand, mechanisms based on Gale's celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature (with the exception of the present context) thanks to their outstanding efficiency features. We present an ...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Postl, Peter
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Two agents must select one of three alternatives. Their ordinal rankings are commonly known and diametrically opposed. Efficiency requires choosing the alternative the agents rank second whenever the weighted sum of their von Neumann Morgenstern utilities is higher than under either agent's favorite alternative. The agents' utilities of the middle-ranked alternative are i.i.d., privately observed random variables. In our setup, which is closely related to a public goods problem where agents fa...
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作者：Hagedorn, Marcus
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is ...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi
作者单位：Harvard University; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Bank of Japan
摘要：We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75-106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Duggan, John; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Rochester; University of Rochester; University of Essex
摘要：We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms. Policy convergence does not maximize voters' welfare. Although candidates' platforms diverge in equilibrium, they do not do so as much as voters would like. We find tha...
