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作者：HEAD, K
摘要：This paper examines a particular instance of infant industry protection: the case of the U.S. steel rail industry. It analyzes the joint roles of learning-by-doing, changing resource endowments, and tariff protection in the emergence of this industry. Making use of estimated demand and cost parameters, the paper simulates what would have happened to prices, production, and welfare under free trade. I calculate that, despite strong learning effects, the steel rail tariff hurt rail users in both...
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作者：MALUEG, DA; SCHWARTZ, M
作者单位：Georgetown University; Tulane University
摘要：Parallel imports, goods imported by unauthorized resellers, are advocated world-wide for undermining international price discrimination. For a continuum of markets, we find that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third-degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is 'large': though uniform pricing avoids output misallocation, too many markets go unserved. Mixed systems, permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets, yiel...
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作者：BAGWELL, K; STAIGER, RW
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We evaluate the case for R&D subsidies in export sectors when the outcome of R&D is uncertain and the product market is oligopolistic. When R&D reduces expected costs in the particular sense of first-order stochastic dominance, a national strategic basis for R&D subsidies exists, whether firms choose prices or quantities. This must be balanced against a corrective incentive to tax R&D whenever the number of domestic firms exceeds one. However, when R&D increases the riskiness of the cost distr...
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作者：COLLIE, D; HVIID, M
摘要：When the domestic government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign monopolist that exports to the domestic market, the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about demand. In the signalling equilibrium, the domestic government uses a tariff which is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information. However, it is possible that welfare in the signalling equilibrium is lower than welfare when the domestic government is uncertain about demand. Th...
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作者：SRIVASTAVA, P
摘要：The credibility problem in trade liberalization has been studied in terms of asymmetric information between government and the private sector with resolution through reputational or signaling equilibria. This paper, in contrast, recognizes the genuine time-inconsistency problem with trade liberalization in countries where institutional underdevelopment implies tariffs are the major source of revenues. The welfare implications of the resulting credibility problem are analyzed. It is further sho...
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作者：FEENSTRA, RC; LEWIS, TR
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In a model where all factors of production are imperfectly mobile, we argue that the Dixit-Norman scheme of commodity taxes may not lead to strict Pareto gains from trade. Rather, this scheme must be augmented by policies that give factors an incentive to move between industries: hence, the role for trade adjustment assistance. By offering an adjustment subsidy to all individuals willing to move, and also using the Dixit-Norman pattern of commodity taxes, the government can implement Pareto ga...
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作者：KLEIN, MW; ROSENGREN, E
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; Tufts University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：There has been a significant correlation between U.S. inward foreign direct investment and the United States real exchange rate since the 1970s. In this paper we examine the determinants of four measures of inward foreign direct investment to the United States from seven industrial countries over the period 1979-1991. We find strong evidence that relative wealth significantly affects U.S. inward foreign direct investment. We find no evidence that relative wages have a significant impact on the...
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作者：TO, T
摘要：I examine export policy using a two-period model of oligopolistic competition with switching costs. A switching costs model captures the idea that market share in one period affects profits and welfare in future periods. If consumers are impatient, firms and governments are patient, and switching costs are significant, then governments subsidize first-period exports and tax second-period exports, otherwise governments tax exports in both periods. Although governments may subsidize first-period...
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作者：BRANDER, JA; SPENCER, BJ
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We consider several designs for trade adjustment assistance, focusing first on the efficiency trade-off between deadweight losses from raising revenue and inefficient incentives induced by (some) assistance programs. We also focus on distributional objectives using a conservative social welfare function. We consider programs that are conditional on being unemployed, conditional on being employed, and unconditional. We also consider fixed payment programs and 'tapered' programs offering payment...
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作者：[Anonymous]
