TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE - WELFARE AND INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF PAYMENTS TO DISPLACED WORKERS

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: BRANDER, JA; SPENCER, BJ
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(94)90003-5
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 239-261
• 关键词: ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE; displaced workers; CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL WELFARE; COMPENSATION

摘要

We consider several designs for trade adjustment assistance, focusing first on the efficiency trade-off between deadweight losses from raising revenue and inefficient incentives induced by (some) assistance programs. We also focus on distributional objectives using a conservative social welfare function. We consider programs that are conditional on being unemployed, conditional on being employed, and unconditional. We also consider fixed payment programs and 'tapered' programs offering payments proportional to the wage erosion suffered by a given worker. Welfare comparisons are ambiguous in general, but in our basic case an unconditional tapered program is welfare superior to the others considered.