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作者：Bagwell, K; Staiger, RW
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the implications of customs-union formation for multilateral tariff cooperation. We model cooperation in multilateral trade policy as self-enforcing, in that it involves balancing the current gains from deviating unilaterally from an agreed-upon trade policy against the future losses from forfeiting the benefits of multilateral cooperation that such a unilateral defection would imply. The early stages of the process of customs-union formation are shown to alter this dynamic incentive ...
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作者：Blomberg, SB; Hess, GD
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：Standard exchange rate models perform poorly in out-of-sample forecasting when compared to the random walk model. We posit part of the poor performance of these models may be due to omission of political factors. We test this hypothesis by including political variables that capture party-specific, election-specific and candidate-specific characteristics. Surprisingly, we find our political model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting at 1-12 month horizons for the pound/dolla...
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作者：Riezman, R; Wilson, JD
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Iowa
摘要：The welfare effects of partial restrictions on political competition are investigated in a model in which two candidates receive campaign contributions from import-competing industries in return for tariff protection. Ceilings on allowable contributions per industry may be welfare-worsening, particularly if the ''contributor elasticity'' is high, because they induce candidates to seek additional contributors. Restrictions that reduce the number of industries allowed to contribute may also wors...
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作者：Daniel, BC
摘要：The neoclassical representative agent model attributes persistent current account imbalance to differences in time preference rates. Exogenous time preference yields corner solutions in which one country owns the world's wealth. With endogenous time preference, corners are avoided, but at the cost of the intuitively unappealing assumption that wealthier agents are more impatient. This paper shows that an agent, with constant relative risk aversion utility, subject to stochastic income shocks, ...
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作者：Huizinga, H; Nielsen, SB
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms. We show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation, both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package. If instead profits can be fully taxed, then source-based investment taxes vanish. If domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners, then source-based investment taxes can be used to shift income ...
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作者：Das, SP
摘要：This paper examines the implications of delegation of quantity or price setting power to the managers by the firm owners, for trade policy. Delegation reduces the scale of strategic trade policy in an exporting industry. In an import-competing oligopoly industry, the optimal tariff is less or greater than the standard optimal tariff depending on whether firms compete in quantity or price. A quantitative import restriction is collusive even when firms compete in quantities, and induces the home...
