Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Das, SP
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/S0022-1996(96)01465-1
发表日期：
1997
页码：
173-188
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines the implications of delegation of quantity or price setting power to the managers by the firm owners, for trade policy. Delegation reduces the scale of strategic trade policy in an exporting industry. In an import-competing oligopoly industry, the optimal tariff is less or greater than the standard optimal tariff depending on whether firms compete in quantity or price. A quantitative import restriction is collusive even when firms compete in quantities, and induces the home firm to become less sales-oriented and produce less. Delegation reduces the gains from integration of similar markets across countries.