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作者：Fleckinger, Pierre
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper reexamines the issue of relative versus joint incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral-hazard framework. The model allows a full analysis of the information and dependence structure. An important result is that the widespread notion that greater correlation in outcomes calls for more competition is not robust. First, when the dependence structure is effort-sensitive, the optimal incentive scheme in general mixes elements of relative evaluation and joint evaluation. Second, under lim...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Princeton University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining, in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements, create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium. For many networks all Markov perfect equilibria of the bar...
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作者：Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
作者单位：Georgetown University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1]. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Alcantud, Jose Carlos R.
作者单位：University of Salamanca
摘要：This paper investigates ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams by representable social welfare relations. We prove that the Hammond Equity postulate and other variations of it like the Pigou Dalton transfer principle are incompatible with positive responsiveness to welfare improvements by every generation. The case of Hammond Equity for the Future is investigated too. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gossner, Olivier; Wilson, Andrea
作者单位：Northwestern University; Paris School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; New York University
摘要：We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model with a long-run player and a series of short-run players. We provide explicit lower bounds on the Nash equilibrium payoffs of a long-run player, both ex-ante and following any positive probability history. Under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero, both bounds converge to the Stackelberg payoff if the ...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers' valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the buyers' otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations. Assuming that the seller announces the mechanism before investing, the paper establishes conditions on the investment technology so that a mechanism exists which lea...
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作者：Miralles, Antonio
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities. I study the nontransfer allocation of two ex-ante identical objects under Bayesian incentive compatibility, with symmetric agents and independent private valuations. I find the ex-ante utilitarian-optimal mechanism, in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as numeraire to purchase probability units of the other obj...
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作者：d'Albis, Hippolyte; Lau, Sau-Him Paul; Sanchez-Romero, Miguel
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Max Planck Society
摘要：Many studies specify human mortality patterns parametrically, with a parameter change affecting mortality rates at different ages simultaneously. Motivated by the stylized fact that a mortality decline affects primarily younger people in the early phase of mortality transition but mainly older people in the later phase, we study how a mortality change at an arbitrary age affects optimal retirement age. Using the Volterra derivative for a functional, we show that mortality reductions at older a...
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作者：Huang, Pidong; Igarashi, Yoske
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Lotteries are introduced into Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008) [2], a version of Trejos and Wright (1995) [4] with aggregate shocks. Lotteries improve welfare and eliminate the two notable features of the optimum with deterministic trades: over-production and history-dependence. Moreover, the optimum can be supported by buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
