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作者：BREYER, F; STRAUB, M
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：A mandatory unfunded pension system can lead to welfare losses if the contributions are levied in such a way that the labor supply decision of the individuals is distorted. This is shown in an overlapping-generations model for a closed economy. Furthermore, it is shown that under certain conditions a gradual abolition of unfunded pensions - using lump-sum contributions in the transition phase - can lead to an intergenerational Pareto improvement. Thus the paper extends a result recently derive...
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作者：CHAMBERS, RG; LOPEZ, R
摘要：The social rate of return to public investment in industries with fixed real-price supports is studied using a simple general-equilibrium model. Fixed real-price supports are shown to enhance the likelihood of immiserizing growth due to capital accumulation or technological innovation in the supported sector. General conditions under which an intervention price will induce a negative social rate of return to public investment are derived.
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作者：LEECHOR, C; MINTZ, J
作者单位：University of Toronto; The World Bank
摘要：The user cost of capital for a subsidiary is derived when the capital exporter uses the deferral method for the taxation of the parent's foreign-source income. The Hartman-Sinn result implying that the capital exporter's tax on remitted dividends is irrelevant to a subsidiary using retentions to finance investment is shown to be correct only when host and home countries have similar corporate income tax bases. Otherwise, both the home and host country corporate tax provisions influence the cos...
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作者：DICK, AR; LOTT, JR
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper provides an efficiency explanation for why rational voters simultaneously re-elect their incumbents and vote for term limits. Our explanation focuses upon a free-riding problem that voters face in choosing their political representatives. Even when all districts would benefit from replacing their political representatives, any individual district will find it costly to remove its own incumbent whose long tenure in office has made him skilled at directing government wealth transfers....
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作者：LOCKWOOD, B; MANNING, A
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyses the effects of a non-linear tax system on wage bargaining. The main conclusions are: an increase in the marginal income or payroll tax rate reduces the pre-tax wage; in the isoelastic case, an increase in the average tax rate increases the pre-tax wage by more than the tax increase, and a measure of the progressivity of the tax system (residual income progression) is a sufficient measure of the effect of the tax system on wage pressure. Empirical evidence is presented to su...
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作者：HOLSEY, CM
摘要：This paper analyzes the extent to which intergovernmental grants create a discrepancy between the local voter's actual and perceived budget constraints. The model is innovative in that it introduces grant illusion due to income misperceptions, theoretically distinguishes illusion caused by income distortions from illusion caused by price distortions, and separately tests for the magnitude of each. Empirical analysis identifies both price and income misperceptions as significant determinants of...
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作者：LEVINSOHN, J; SLEMROD, J
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper we develop some simple models of optimal tax and tariff policy in the presence of global corporations that operate in an imperfectly competitive environment. The models emphasize two important differences in the practical application of tax and tariff policy - tax, but not tariff, policy can apply to offshore output, and tariff, but not tax, policy can be industry-specific. Recognizing that multinationals' production decisions are endogenous to the tax and tariff policies they fa...
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作者：MARCHAND, M
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作者：LEWBEL, A
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作者：KIANDER, J
摘要：The aim of the paper is to derive an optimal unemployment insurance policy for a utilitarian trade union when job search matters. It is shown that the well-known result from the theory of insurance concerning the optimal risk sharing between risk averse agents changes essentially, if the search behavior is allowed to affect the performance of the labor market. We assume that labor market mismatch decreases with search effort, which in turn decreases with the benefit. The resulting equilibrium ...
