作者：DEFRAJA, G
摘要：This paper compares the degree of X-inefficiency which emerges as a consequence of the imposition of the optimal incentive contracts in public and private firms. Using a straightforward principal-agent model, with two possible states of the world, it establishes the rather surprising result that, in the good state of the world, public ownership always results in a higher degree of productive efficiency.
作者：POGODZINSKI, JM; SJOQUIST, DL
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：This paper presents two specifications of a simple general equilibrium model of a local public goods economy in which median voters determine the tax-expenditure package in each jurisdiction. Within the context of this model, two alternative tax regimes, a local income tax and a property tax, are compared. Prices, incomes, utility levels and the allocation of individuals across jurisdictions are shown to depend on the tax regime.
