RECONCILING VOTERS BEHAVIOR WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
DICK, AR; LOTT, JR
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90057-Z
发表日期：
1993
页码：
1-14
关键词：
摘要：
This paper provides an efficiency explanation for why rational voters simultaneously re-elect their incumbents and vote for term limits. Our explanation focuses upon a free-riding problem that voters face in choosing their political representatives. Even when all districts would benefit from replacing their political representatives, any individual district will find it costly to remove its own incumbent whose long tenure in office has made him skilled at directing government wealth transfers. Term limits offer voters a way to coordinate their actions and overcome this free-riding problem. Placing a limit on the tenure of all representatives ensures that no one district will benefit at the expense of other districts when their representative is removed from office. The argument also provides an explanation for why increased government transfers increases the length of tenure. As transfers increase, it becomes more costly to reduce the relative tenure of your representative.
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