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作者:Leach, J
摘要:It is assumed that there are two regions, that production requires both skilled and unskilled labour, and that one region is innately more productive than the other. Workers, who differ in their migration or training costs? make individually rational decisions. In equilibrium the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers is always higher in the more productive region. Average incomes differ between regions because regional differences in wage rates are reinforced by regional differences in...
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作者:Palfrey, TR; Prisbrey, JE
作者单位:Pompeu Fabra University
摘要:We report an experiment using a design that permits the direct measurement of individual decision rules in voluntary contribution games, We estimate the distribution of altruism in our subjects and find that observed 'overcontribution' is attributable to a combination of random variation in behavior and a few altruistic players. We also employ Andreoni's partners/strangers design to measure reputation effects. The only difference observed is that the strangers treatment produces slightly more ...
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作者:Fleurbaey, M
摘要:The solutions proposed in the literature on fair allocations are sensitive to the preference profiles of the agents. As a consequence, each of them displays a specific distribution pattern which may be interpreted as rewarding certain kinds of preferences at the expense of others. In the basic models with private goods and decreasing returns, the Equal Income Competitive Equilibrium tends to favor the eccentric preferences, whereas most egalitarian-equivalent solutions tend to reward the agent...
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作者:Asheim, GB
作者单位:Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要:It is shown within a given framework that, with the world economy following an egalitarian path, the aggregate capital gains being positive is equivalent to the interest rate tending to decrease. This result is of importance for the concept of net national product in open economies. In particular, with positive aggregate capital gains, an open economy cannot sustain consuming the return on its capital stocks, since some part of the return must be used to augment the country's national wealth. ...
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作者:Mayshar, J; Yitzhaki, S
作者单位:Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要:In a previous paper we suggested a method for identifying tax reforms that adhere to Dalton's principle of transfers, approving a small enough transfer from 'rich' to 'poor'. However, even the weak requirement from that method, namely prescribing a uni-dimensional ordinal ranking of households by how deserving they are of a marginal income transfer, is confining. Here we extend the approach by formulating a two-dimensional criterion for a Dalton-improving tax reform, when there is social appro...
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作者:Kofman, F; Lawarree, J
作者单位:University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要:We examine a model wherein a principal can use an auditor's report to contract with a privately informed manager. The auditor can be honest or dishonest, a fact unknown to the principal who must thus decide whether to allow or deter collusion. Deterring collusion is costly because the principal has to reward both dishonest and honest auditors for refusing a bribe from the manager. Allowing collusion is costly because the dishonest auditors will erode the deterrence of the punishment. We show t...
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作者:Nechyba, T
作者单位:National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:This paper introduces a theoretical and a calibrated computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental relations in which heterogeneous agents (i) are endowed with income and houses, (ii) are fully mobile between multiple jurisdictions, and (iii) vote in both local and state elections to determine local property and state income tax rates. Three different types of intergovernmental programs are analyzed: (i) redistributive revenue sharing, (ii) district power equalization and (iii) ded...
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作者:Mintz, J; Tulkens, H
作者单位:Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Toronto
摘要:Foreign source capital income taxes are examined from the point of view of optimal taxation. In the framework of a simple economy with international real capital flows, a taxonomy of alternative systems of such taxation is first presented, showing how crediting and other tax parameters induce what are called source-based, residence-based and related systems. Next, tax rates are determined that are optimal from a single country's point of view, given those of the others. The achievability of th...
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作者:Falkinger, J
摘要:This paper proposes the following incentive scheme for the private provision of public goods: government should reward and penalize deviations from the mean contribution by an appropriate factor. This makes efficient contribution individually rational even if individuals see through the government budget constraint.
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作者:Frey, BS; Eichenberger, R
摘要:Neoclassical public economists stress economic distortions induced by differential taxation and therefore favour harmonization; political economists focus on political distortions and therefore reject harmonization. However, policy choices on the possibility frontier between economic and political distortions tend to be biased: economic advisers, politicians and interest groups typically favour harmonization. Harmonization is, moreover, undermined by incentives to re-establish tax differences....