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作者：Anderson, PM; Meyer, BD
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine the common, but unexamined, case of a tax or government mandate whose cost differs across firms within the same labor market. Our theoretical model shows that this variation can lead to employment reallocation across firms and dead-weight losses, even if there is no aggregate employment effect. Using firm level unemployment insurance tax data, we find that while the market level tax is mostly born by the worker, individual firms can only pass on a small share of the within market di...
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作者：Fernandez, R
摘要：This paper examines the comparative statics properties of multicommunity models in which perfect sorting is not obtained because the number of types of individuals is greater than the number of communities. In general, equilibrium is inefficient and policy interventions can be Pareto improving. The paper shows that the welfare effects of a given policy depend critically on whether the number of communities is odd or even. The same policy intervention that is Pareto improving for an even number...
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作者：Hoel, M
摘要：In order to reach a Pareto optimal outcome with transboundary environmental problems, there must be some kind of international environmental agreement. One possibility is to have an international environmental agreement focusing directly on emissions in each country. Given such an agreement, an important issue is whether one ought to supplement the agreement with some kind of policy coordination, or if the choice of environmental policies should be left to each country to decide on unilaterall...
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作者：Sutherland, A
摘要：This paper shows how the power of fiscal policy to affect consumption can vary depending on the level of public debt. At moderate levels of debt fiscal policy has the traditional keynesian effects, Current generations of consumers discount future taxes because they may not be alive when taxes are raised (or there will be a larger population available to pay the taxes). But when debt reaches extreme values, current generations of consumers know there is a high probability that they will have to...
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作者：Boardman, A; Vertinsky, I; Whistler, D
摘要：Analysis and evaluation of regulatory actions require inexpensive and timely information about resultant costs and benefits. This paper extends the traditional 'event study' methodology for assessing the impact of regulatory actions on the value of publicly traded firms. We use diffusion theory to construct several models of how markets adjust to regulatory events. Ex ante preference for a particular model is based on prior knowledge about the characteristics of the regulatory event and inform...
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作者：LeiteMonteiro, M
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：It is generally believed that international labour mobility lowers the level of redistribution each country wishes to undertake. This paper considers a model with two countries where each government redistributes income between two types of individuals. Using a general equilibrium model it is shown that there are situations where the level of redistribution in one of the two countries is in fact higher than in the absence of individual mobility. This higher level of redistribution is explained...
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作者：Besley, T; Preston, I; Ridge, M
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London; Brunel University
摘要：The UK's experience with the poll tax reminds us that even in an economy with a relatively well developed detection and legal system, one cannot take tax compliance for granted. The experience of the poll tax provides a unique opportunity to study many dimensions of tax compliance. We model nonpayment rates in a short panel of data on the English local authorities. The transparent observability of liabilities makes reliable measurement of rates of nonpayment possible. Moreover, these rates ros...
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作者：DeFraja, G
作者单位：Chuo University
摘要：This paper studies the optimal regulatory policy in a marker where entry may occur. In the event of entry, the regulator regulates the incumbent, but not the entrant. We show that the effect of entry on prices depends on the length of the interval between regulatory reviews: if the gap is long, then the market outcome following entry has a higher price than it would have with a shorter gap. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
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作者：Sinn, HW
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：If governments stepped in where markets failed, reintroducing markets through the backdoor of systems competition will again result in marl:et failure. Three models are presented which illustrate this wisdom. The first is concerned with congestion-prone public goods and shows that fiscal competition may be ruinous for the governments. The second considers the insurance function of redistributive taxation and shows that systems competition may suffer from adverse selection. The third studies th...
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作者：Walz, U; Wellisch, D
作者单位：Technische Universitat Dresden; Ruhr University Bochum
摘要：Given conditions of oligopolistic competition, the coordinated ban of direct export-promoting policies (e.g. in the EU or by GATT) increases the income of exporting countries. However, in the presence of environmental distortions, free trade can lead to ecological dumping in exporting countries. The question arises if free trade is still in the interest of exporting countries. We show that welfare-maximizing governments of exporting countries prefer free trade even if countries subsidize their...
