作者：Pestieau, P; Possen, UM; Slutsky, SM
作者单位：University of Liege; Cornell University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：Consider individuals who draw income from the same random distribution but who differ in their risk aversion and who decide whether or not to report their income truthfully. The government chooses the tax structure including a random tax option, audit probabilities, and penalties on detected evaders to maximize expected ex post social welfare. High income individuals who do not evade then choose to pay either a given amount or draw from a random tax schedule. This schedule ensures that everyon...
作者：Corneo, G; Jeanne, O
作者单位：University of Bonn; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We develop a model of status seeking in the presence of incomplete information and derive its implications for aggregate savings. Status seeking endogenously takes the form of conspicuous consumption. Its impact on savings depends on the scheduling of the contests for status over the life cycle. If individuals engage in conspicuous consumption when old, aggregate savings are increased. We also study the role of social segmentation. While social segmentation reduces the inequality across status...
