The value of explicit randomization in the tax code

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pestieau, P; Possen, UM; Slutsky, SM
• 署名单位: University of Liege; Cornell University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00056-X
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 87-103
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; uncertainty; Tax evasion

摘要

Consider individuals who draw income from the same random distribution but who differ in their risk aversion and who decide whether or not to report their income truthfully. The government chooses the tax structure including a random tax option, audit probabilities, and penalties on detected evaders to maximize expected ex post social welfare. High income individuals who do not evade then choose to pay either a given amount or draw from a random tax schedule. This schedule ensures that everyone complies with more risk averse individuals choosing the deterministic schedule and less risk averse ones choosing the random tax option. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.