-
作者：Finkelstein, A
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper presents new evidence of the effect of the tax subsidy to employer-provided health insurance on coverage by such insurance, I study the effects of a 1993 tax change that reduced the tax subsidy to employer-provided supplementary health insurance in Quebec by almost 60%. Using a differences-in-differences methodology in which changes in Quebec are compared to changes in other provinces not affected by the tax change, I find that this tax change was associated with a decrease of about...
-
作者：Feldstein, M
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The nature and content of research and teaching in public economics have changed enormously during the past three decades. The field is more theoretically rigorous, more empirical, more focused on real policy issues, and more concerned with government spending as well as with taxation. For me, it has been an exciting time to be a public finance economist and to contribute to this intellectual transformation. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Diamond, P
-
作者：Spraggon, J
作者单位：Lakehead University
摘要：The ability of four instruments within the general class of exogenous targeting instruments, proposed by Segerson [Journal of Environmental Economic Management 15 (1988) 87], to induce socially optimal outcomes in a group moral hazard environment is investigated in an experiment based on Nalbantian and Schotter [American Economic Review 87 (1997) 314]. Both instruments based on the Holmstrom [Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982) 324] forcing contract with multiple equilibria, and instruments ba...
-
作者：Parry, IWH
作者单位：Resources for the Future
摘要：This paper compares the efficiency of a single lane toll, a uniform congestion tax across freeway lanes, a gasoline tax, and a transit fare subsidy at reducing congestion. There are three conditions for an efficient outcome relating to travel across modes, across peak and off-peak periods, and sorting out drivers with high and low time costs across faster and slower freeway lanes. Each policy involves some inefficiency. Indeed the single lane toll, gasoline tax, and transit subsidy forego at l...
-
作者：Stiglitz, JE
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：The advances in the economics of the public sector during the past quarter century have been as pronounced as in any field within economics. Public finance has become a rigorous branch of applied microeconomics, incorporating the best thinking and most advanced tools of both theoretical economics and econometrics. In the remarks below, I will focus on a few key areas in applied and theoretical tax and expenditure policy, drawing both upon the academic work of myself and others, and my experien...
-
作者：Ottaviano, GIP; Thisse, JF
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This paper tackles the issue of the optimality of agglomeration in a two-region economy with skilled/mobile and unskilled/immobile workers. The market leads to the optimal outcome when transport costs are high or low. However, for intermediate values, it yields agglomeration whereas dispersion is socially desirable. The reasons for this inefficiency are then analyzed. Finally, we show that competitive lobbying on factor mobility by the two groups of workers sustains the second best optimum. (C...
-
作者：Fisman, R; Gatti, R
作者单位：Columbia University; The World Bank; The World Bank
摘要：The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. The theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship, and it has remained little studied by empiricists. In this paper, we systematically examine this issue empirically, by looking at the cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption, as measured by a nu...
-
作者：Laffont, JJ
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
-
作者：Cremer, H; Gahvari, F
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：This paper studies the second-best tax design problem when emissions are publicly unobservable but can be discovered through costly monitoring. A representative firm in industry chooses its emissions and declarations to maximize its expected profits. The paper shows: The Pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions is modified to take account of the resource costs of monitoring and enforcement; emissions from diff...
