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作者：Barrow, L
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：In this paper I show how the monetary value parents place on school quality may be inferred from their residential location choice. The method identifies parental valuation of school quality from the differential effect of school quality on residential choices of households with and without children. I implement the method with 1990 Census data for Washington, D.C. For whites, households with children are willing to pay $1800 more per year for schools generating a 100 SAT point advantage. Whil...
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作者：Kessler, D; McClellan, M
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Because fee-for-service health insurance insulates providers from the costs of treatment decisions, it may lead to defensive medicine - precautionary treatment with minimal expected medical benefit administered out of fear of legal liability. By giving providers higher-powered incentives, managed care may affect optimal liability policy. Among elderly Medicare beneficiaries with heart disease in 1984-1994, we find that liability-reducing tort reforms reduce defensive practices in areas with hi...
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作者：Flores, NE
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：Bergstrom showed that a necessary condition for a Pareto optimum with non-paternalistic altruism is classification as a selfish Pareto optimum. This paper shows that Bergstrom's result does not generalize to the benefit-cost analysis of generic changes in public goods. There may exist good projects that will be rejected by a selfish-benefit cost test, a selfish test error. Selfish test error is linked to preference interdependence between public goods and income distribution, the same conditio...
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作者：Chalkley, M; Malcomson, JM
作者单位：University of Dundee; University of Oxford
摘要：Fixed price payments for treatment of patients with a specified diagnosis are widespread in both US Medicare and the British NHS even though there are substantial variations in the cost of treatment. Theory suggests that, when there is asymmetric information about those costs, total payment can be reduced by cost sharing. This paper uses data from Medicare to assess the cost savings that might be feasible in practice from cost sharing. For diagnosis related groups with low cost variation, the ...
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作者：van Dijk, F; Sonnemans, J; van Winden, F
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good game. In the third part the attitudes of subjects to their partners in the public good game is measured. The concept of a social tie is operationalized as the difference between the measurements in the...
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作者：Haan, M; Kooreman, P
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：A wealth of experimental literature studies the effect of repetition and group size on the extent of free riding in the provision of public goods. In this paper, we use data from honor systems for candy bars in 166 firms to test whether such effects can be found outside the laboratory. We find that free riding increases with repetition, and weak evidence that free riding decreases with group size. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Tangerås, TP
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper analyses the incentives for collusion among firms when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition. The central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private, correlated information and are unable to communicate later. The analysis shows that collusion is costly to society only if firms can commit to side payments. Third-best, collusion-proof yardstick competition entails more (less) distortion of efficiency for low-prod...
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作者：Conley, JP; Konishi, H
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Boston College
摘要：Tiebout's basic claim was that when public goods are local, competition between jurisdictions solves the free riding problem in the sense that equilibria exist and are always Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, the literature does not quite support this conjecture. For finite economies, one must choose between notions of Tiebout equilibrium which are Pareto optimal but which may be empty, or which are nonempty but may be inefficient. This paper introduces a new equilibrium notion called migration...
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作者：Decressin, J
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper investigates income redistribution and risk sharing and the underlying public policy in Italy, a country marked by stark regional economic contrasts. Unlike previous works, this study also assesses the roles of public consumption, investment, and welfare assistance in kind. The findings suggest that Italy's fiscal system provides redistribution at 25-35% and risk sharing at 10-15% of GDP, with public consumption playing a large role. Compared with results in the literature for other...
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作者：Cutler, D; Marchand, M
