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作者：Boyer, M; Laffont, JJ
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Institut Universitaire de France; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Institut Universitaire de France; Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a regulation problem with complete contracting in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and review within this model the various channels by which external competition parameters affect incentives within the regulated firm. The channels are: the principal's information, the principal's objective function, the agent's incentive constraint, the agent's participation constraint. We consider in particular a better information structure, a threat of liquidation, a fight for tal...
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作者：Rioja, FK
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：The maintenance of existing public infrastructure has often been neglected in favor of building new infrastructure in developing countries. This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model that analyzes the reasons and effects of such neglect. First, the optimal level of maintenance is shown to depend on the size of new investments as a share of existing public infrastructure and on the productivity of infrastructure. Second, the model is parameterized and solved numerically for a sampl...
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作者：Brekke, KA; Kverndokk, S; Nyborg, K
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：In this paper, we present an economic model of moral motivation. Consumers prefer regarding themselves as socially responsible individuals. Voluntary contributions to public goods are motivated by this preference. The self-image as socially responsible is determined by a comparison of one's actual behavior against an endogenous morally ideal behavior. Public policy influences voluntary contributions through its effects on relative prices and budget or time constraints, but also indirectly thro...
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作者：Lange, A; Vogt, C
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the...
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作者：Brender, A
作者单位：Bank of Israel
摘要：We discuss the circumstances under which voters in local elections will reward fiscal responsibility and suggest that such circumstances evolved in Israel in the mid-1990s. We present empirical evidence that, indeed, fiscal performance of mayors substantially affected their reelection probability in the 1998 campaign but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns. Changes in the political environment, enforcement of audit and financial reporting requirements, tougher imposition of hard budget constrai...
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作者：Olofsgård, A
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper presents a model on secessions and nationalism, with special emphasis on the role of imperfectly mobile ethnic minorities. Individuals trade off political benefits of homogeneity against economic costs from increasing returns to scale in production. The main findings are: (i) Mobility decreases the political motivation for independence, because increased competition for labour forces the ethnic majorities in the separating countries to accommodate their policy. (ii) The impact of mo...
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作者：Dhami, S
作者单位：Newcastle University - UK
摘要：This paper examines the political economy of redistribution when voters have asymmetric information about the redistributive preferences of politicians and the latter cannot make credible policy commitments. The candidates in each party are endogenously selected by a process of Nash Bargaining between the competing factions. In equilibrium, there is 'partial convergence' of redistributive policies, support for 'Director's Law', the possibility of 'policy reversals' across the parties, and 'int...
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作者：Nordblom, K
作者单位：University of Gothenburg
摘要：Empirical findings suggest different causes for higher educational attainment among children of high-income earners, either that poor parents are credit constrained, or that parental human capital per se is important in the educational process. My theoretical results show how these two diverging results can be brought together. Parental and public investments complement each other in the educational process. Because higher educated parents take advantage of increased productivity, educational ...
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作者：Ballou, JP; Weisbrod, BA
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for-profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers. Substantially less is known about differences among governmental, religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit organizations. We examine the compensation of hospital CEOs to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives. Compensation levels, the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives, ...
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作者：Hanson, R
作者单位：George Mason University
摘要：One explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality. But why not just communicate the information in their ban, perhaps via a 'would have banned' label? Because product labeling is cheap-talk, any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality, inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told. In fact, when regulators expect market failures to result in under-consumption of a drug, and so would not ban it ...
