Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ballou, JP; Weisbrod, BA
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00224-9
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1895-1920
• 关键词: nonprofit; comparative institutional form; organization behavior; incentives

摘要

Studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for-profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers. Substantially less is known about differences among governmental, religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit organizations. We examine the compensation of hospital CEOs to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives. Compensation levels, the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives, and the criteria organizations use to determine bonuses are analyzed. We conclude that the CEO incentive contracts at religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and governmental hospitals imply substantive differences in the behavior of these organizations. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.