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作者：Fong, Christina M.; Luttmer, Erzo F. P.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Dartmouth College
摘要：We present a dictator game experiment where the recipients are local charities that serve the poor. Donors consist of approximately 1000 participants from a nationally representative sample. We manipulate the perceived worthiness and race of the charities' recipients with an audiovisual presentation. Respondents then decide how much to give to the charities and report their perceptions of recipient worthiness and racial composition. We have four main findings. First, treatments describing reci...
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作者：Meer, Jonathan; Rosen, Harvey S.
作者单位：Princeton University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We estimate the effect of a marginal personal solicitation after receiving two to four non-personal solicitations using observational data on alumni giving at an anonymous research university, which we refer to as Anon U. At Anon U, volunteers use lists provided by the Development Office to telephone classmates and solicit them for donations. The names on these lists are always in alphabetical order. The volunteers who do the soliciting often run out of time before they reach the end of their ...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Holmes, Jessica; Matthews, Peter Hans
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：Despite its popularity as a fundraiser for charities, very little research has been done on the bidding and revenue properties of the silent auction. This paper examines the consequences of two behaviors common in silent auctions, jump-bidding and sniping, in laboratory experiments with endogenous participation. Our results suggest that deliberative jumping, the result of impatient bidders attempting to telescope time, tends to increase revenue, while deliberative sniping by experienced bidder...
