Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Carpenter, Jeffrey; Holmes, Jessica; Matthews, Peter Hans
• 署名单位: Middlebury College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.010
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 395-402
• 关键词: charity; Silent auction; Revenue proportional benefits; Endogenous participation; Jump-bidding; Sniping

摘要

Despite its popularity as a fundraiser for charities, very little research has been done on the bidding and revenue properties of the silent auction. This paper examines the consequences of two behaviors common in silent auctions, jump-bidding and sniping, in laboratory experiments with endogenous participation. Our results suggest that deliberative jumping, the result of impatient bidders attempting to telescope time, tends to increase revenue, while deliberative sniping by experienced bidders tends to decrease it. We also show that when charities can encourage jumping and discourage sniping, silent auctions can perform as well as their sometimes more entertaining but more expensive alternative, the English auction. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V.. All rights reserved.