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作者：Walsh, F
摘要：The pattern of effort and wages is derived in a multisector efficiency wage model. Firms choose effort endogenously. Easily monitored or low-turnover jobs have high effort and may have low wages in equilibrium. Empirical wage differentials from a measure of supervision are smaller than observed industry differentials that have been attributed to efficiency wage models and are closer to those predicted by the model. Workers can search for and avail of on-the-job offers. If sectors grow at diffe...
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作者：Montgomery, JD
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article examines a dynamic adverse-selection model that generates equilibrium employment cycles. In the model, firms hire workers from unemployment, observe workers' productivity through time, and (following the profit-maximizing rule) eventually fire unproductive workers. If hiring costs are low, the dynamical system converges to a steady state in which the unemployment pool contains mostly low-ability workers. However, if hiring costs are sufficiently large, this lemons effect would mak...
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作者：Neal, D
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The model of job search involves both employer matches and career matches. Workers may change employers without changing careers but cannot search over possible lines of work while working for one employer. The optimal policy implies a two-stage search strategy in which workers search over types of work first. The patterns of job changes observed in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth support this two-stage search policy. Among male workers who are changing jobs, those who have previousl...
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作者：Baker, M; Benjamin, D; Stanger, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of Toronto
摘要：We examine the effects of minimum wage legislation in Canada over the period 1975-93. For teenagers we find that a 10% increase in the minimum wage is associated with roughly a 2.5% decrease in employment. We also find that this result is driven by low frequency variation in the data. At high frequencies the elasticity is positive and insignificant. The difference in the elasticity across the bandwidth has implications for the interpretation of employment dynamics as a result of minimum wage p...
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作者：Sasaki, M
作者单位：Georgetown University; The World Bank
摘要：This article analyzes the effect of coworker discrimination on wage and unemployment differentials between males and females using a search model. An increase in female participation drives up the wage offer to female workers and raises female employment. Moreover, an increase in the degree of discrimination by males results in gains to them in terms of higher wages and lower unemployment but results in losses to females in terms of lower wages and higher unemployment. The benefit to males pro...
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作者：Parent, D
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; McGill University; McGill University
摘要：Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, this article examines the impact of employer provided training on the wage profile and on the mobility of young workers. The main results ape that (i) training with the current employer has a positive effect on the wage; (ii) employers seem to reward skills acquired through training with previous employers as much as skills they provide themselves; and (iii) part of the skills acquired through training programs provided by the current ...
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作者：Lazear, EP
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：In 1987, the Journal of Labor Economics published an issue on the economics of personnel. Since then, personnel economics, defined as the application of labor economics principles to business issues, has become a major part of labor economics, now accounting for a substantial proportion of papers in this and other journals. Much of the work in personnel economics has been theoretical, in large part because the data needed to test these theories have not been available. In recent years, a numbe...
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作者：Eriksson, T
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：This article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a cheery of executive compensation. I test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2,600 executives in 210 Danish firms during a 4-year period. I ask, Are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation? Is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments? Is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants? Is average pay ...
