A multisector model of efficiency wages

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Walsh, F
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209924
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 351-376
• 关键词: worker discipline device; fast-food industry; minimum-wage; supervision; unemployment; CONSEQUENCES; pay

摘要

The pattern of effort and wages is derived in a multisector efficiency wage model. Firms choose effort endogenously. Easily monitored or low-turnover jobs have high effort and may have low wages in equilibrium. Empirical wage differentials from a measure of supervision are smaller than observed industry differentials that have been attributed to efficiency wage models and are closer to those predicted by the model. Workers can search for and avail of on-the-job offers. If sectors grow at different rates or the unemployment rate changes, the pattern of wage differentials is unaffected.