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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Acemoglu, D
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：While much research in political economy points out the benefits of limited government, political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by weak states, which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest i...
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作者：Hassler, J; Krusell, P; Storesletten, K; Zilibotti, F
作者单位：Stockholm University; Princeton University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Oslo
摘要：We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations. We find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment. The difference is larger, the lower is the political influence of young agents, the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations, and the lower is risk-aversion. Furthermore, there tends to be too much redistribution i...
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作者：Barro, RJ; Lee, JW
作者单位：Harvard University; Korea University
摘要：IMF loans react to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy variables. Loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more professional staff at the IMF and when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States and major European countries. These results are of considerable interest for their own sake. More importantly for present purposes, the results provide instrumental variables for estimating the effects ...
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作者：Brender, A; Drazen, A
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Bank of Israel
摘要：Like other recent studies, we find a political deficit cycle in a large cross-section of countries, but show that this result is driven by the experience of new democracies. The political budget cycle in new democracies accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that include these countries and disappears when they are removed from the larger sample. The political deficit cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both developed and less developed economies, for the st...
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作者：Alesina, A; Angeletos, GM
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed...
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作者：Giavazzi, F; Tabellini, G
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：This paper studies empirically the effects and the interactions of economic and political liberalizations. Economic liberalizations are measured as reforms that increase the scope of the market. Political liberalizations correspond to the event of becoming a democracy. Using difference-in-difference estimation, we study the effects on economic performance, macroeconomic policy and structural policies. Our main contribution is the analysis of the Joint effects of both liberalizations, and the f...
