Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Brender, A; Drazen, A
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Bank of Israel
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.004
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1271-1295
• 关键词: Political budget cycle; new democracy; fiscal manipulation

摘要

Like other recent studies, we find a political deficit cycle in a large cross-section of countries, but show that this result is driven by the experience of new democracies. The political budget cycle in new democracies accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that include these countries and disappears when they are removed from the larger sample. The political deficit cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both developed and less developed economies, for the stronger cycle in weaker democracies, and for differences in the political cycle across governmental and electoral systems. Our findings may reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one that it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread empirical phenomenon, the other that voters punish rather than reward fiscal manipulation. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.