Corruption, inequality, and fairness

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Alesina, A; Angeletos, GM
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.05.003
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1227-1244
• 关键词: corruption; rent seeking; INEQUALITY; fairness; redistribution; political economy

摘要

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.