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作者：Coles, M; Masters, A
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This article considers optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium matching framework where wages are determined by strategic bargaining. It compares the outcome with the standard Nash bargaining approach, which can be interpreted as union wage bargaining with an insider/outsider distortion. It also shows that a coordinated policy approach, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, generates a much greater welfare gain than a policy that simply varies UI payments by d...
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作者：Black, Dan A.; Smith, Jeffrey A.
作者单位：Syracuse University; University of Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Existing studies of the effects of college quality on wages typically rely on a single proxy variable for college quality. This study questions the wisdom of using a single proxy given that it likely contains substantial measurement error. We consider four econometric approaches to the problem that involve the use of multiple proxies for college quality: factor analysis, instruments variables, a method recently proposed by Lubotsky and Wittenberg, and a GMM estimator. Our estimates suggest tha...
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作者：Hotz, V. Joseph; Imbens, Guido W.; Klerman, Jacob A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We show how data from an evaluation in which subjects are randomly assigned to some treatment versus a control group can be combined with nonexperimental methods to estimate the differential effects of alternative treatments. We propose tests for the validity of these methods. We use these methods and tests to analyze the differential effects of labor force attachment (LFA) versus human capital development (HCD) training components with data from California's Greater Avenues to Independence (G...
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作者：Heckman, James J.; LaFontaine, Paul A.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Using three sources of data, this article examines the direct economic return to General Educational Development (GED) certification for both native and immigrant high school dropouts. One data source the Current Population Survey (CPS)-is plagued by nonresponse and allocation bias from the hot deck procedure that biases the estimated return to the GED upward. Correcting for allocation bias and ability bias, there is no direct economic return to GED certification. An apparent return to GED cer...
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作者：Bohlmark, Anders; Lindquist, Matthew J.
作者单位：Stockholm University
摘要：We apply Haider and Solon's generalized errors-in-variables model to Swedish income tax data to produce estimates of the association between current and lifetime income. Our estimates demonstrate strong life-cycle patterns. This implies that the widespread use of current income as a proxy for lifetime income leads to inconsistent parameter estimates (i.e., life-cycle bias) even when the proxy is used as the dependent variable. Estimates for comparable cohorts of Swedish and American men demons...
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作者：Choe, CW
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：I study optimal managerial contracts in two contracting environments. When the investment return is contractible, an optimal contract combines a base salary, golden parachute, and bonus. When the return is not contractible, two types of optimal contracts are studied: a contract with restricted stock and a contract with stock options. These three types of contracts are equivalent: they implement the same outcome and lead to the same expected payoff for the manager, implying that the choice of c...
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作者：Johnson, William R.; Ziliak, James P.
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Kentucky
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作者：Ishida, Junichiro
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This article considers a model where the agent is uncertain about his innate ability and instead makes an inference from others' ( namely, the principal's) perception, as often emphasized in the psychology literature. When the principal has superior knowledge about the agent's productivity than the agent himself, the principal has an incentive to use promotions strategically to boost the agent's self-confidence. Within this framework the optimal promotion policy depends not only on the agent's...
